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DISAPPEARING PARADIGMS IN SHAREHOLDER 
PROTECTION: LEXIMETRIC EVIDENCE FOR 30 
COUNTRIES, 1990–2013
DIONYSIA KATELOUZOU* AND MATHIAS SIEMS**
Scholars frequently claim that the path dependency of  the law, the influence of  the 
US model of  corporate governance, and the role of  legal origin and the stage of  legal 
development are key for a comparative understanding of  shareholder protection. This 
article, however, suggests that these paradigms of  comparative company law gradually 
seem to be disappearing. The basis for our assessment is an original leximetric dataset 
that measures the development of  shareholder protection for 30 countries over the last 
24 years. Using tools of  descriptive statistics, time series and cluster analysis, our 
main findings are that all legal origins now have on average about the same level of  
shareholder protection, that paternalistic tools have overtaken enabling tools of  protection, 
and that, after the global financial crisis, this area has become a less frequent object of  
law reforms.
A. IntroductIon
Recent decades have seen a growing internationalisation in debates about 
company law. International organisations, such as the World Bank and the 
OECD, aim to promote good models of  corporate governance and domestic 
law makers have the aspiration to catch up with legal innovations of  other coun-
tries in order to ensure the competitiveness of  their companies.1 In academia 
there has also been a growing trend to teach and write about company law 
beyond the domestic level. For example, many universities now offer modules 
on international, comparative or European company law, and a number of  
* King’s College London.
** Durham University. We gratefully acknowledge funding from the ESRC’s “Rising Powers” 
Programme for compiling the dataset underlying this article. We also thank the country experts
for their help in collecting the information underlying the shareholder protection dataset (see
Part B below), as well as Brian Cheffins and Gerhard Schnyder for helpful comments.
1 There is a wide literature on these issues: see, eg A Dignam and M Galanis, The Globalization 
of  Corporate Governance (Ashgate 2009); D Milman, National Corporate Law in a Globalised Market:
The UK Experience in Perspective (Edward Elgar 2009); AR Pinto, ‘Globalization and the Study of
Comparative Corporate Governance’ (2005) 23 Wisconsin International Law Journal 477.
© 2015 The Author(s). Published by Taylor & Francis.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and 
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new books on comparative company law have been published in the last four 
years.2
Given this trend, it may be seen as a positive development that recent 
research in comparative company law has identified certain paradigms on 
which most scholars agree. It is suggested that these can be summarised as 
follows: first, there is the frequent view that the development of  company law 
is path-dependent, and that therefore the core characteristics of  a country’s law 
are persistent and not subject to frequent changes or major shifts.3 Secondly, it 
is often thought that a market-oriented conception of  company law has become 
the dominant one, in particular as we may observe an Americanisation of  
company law in many countries of  the world.4 Thirdly, in order to explain the 
remaining differences in strength and forms of  shareholder protection, many 
scholars claim that legal origins and the stage of  economic development are 
the most decisive factors.5
However, this emergence of  paradigms can also be thought of  as problem-
atic as far as they do not hold up to empirical scrutiny. It is the aim of  this 
article to provide such an empirical assessment. For this purpose, we use an 
original leximetric dataset about the development of  shareholder protection 
in 30 countries between 1990 and 2013, and assess these data with tools of  
descriptive statistics, time series and cluster analysis. In so doing, we show that 
those key paradigms have weakened, or even disappeared, in recent years.
The corresponding structure of  this article is as follows. In order to set the 
scene, Part B explains the previous leximetric research and the current dataset 
on shareholder protection. Part C discusses the general development of  share-
holder protection according to this dataset, based on the strength of  protection 
in individual countries as well as the aggregates for each of  the variables. 
Part D presents a time series analysis of  this dataset and identifies possible 
2 AM Fleckner and KJ Hopt (eds), Comparative Corporate Governance: A Functional and International 
Analysis (CUP 2013); M Siems and D Cabrelli (eds), Comparative Company Law—A Case-Based 
Approach (Hart Publishing 2013); R Bohinc, Comparative Company Law: An Overview on US and Some 
EU Countries’ Company Legislation on Corporate Governance (VDM 2011); A Cahn and DC Donald, 
Comparative Company Law (CUP 2010).
3 Eg LA Bebchuk and MJ Roe, ‘A Theory of  Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and 
Governance’ (1999) 52 Stanford Law Review 127; MJ Roe, ‘Corporate Law’s Limits’ (2002) 
31 Journal of  Legal Studies 233; DM Branson, ‘The Very Uncertain Prospect of  “Global” 
Convergence in Corporate Governance’ (2001) 34 Cornell International Law Journal 321.
4 Eg H Hansmann and R Kraakman, ‘The End of  History for Corporate Law’ (2001) 88 
Georgetown Law Journal 439; BR Cheffins and RS Thomas, ‘The Globalization (Americani-
zation?) of  Executive Pay’ (2004) 1 Berkeley Business Law Journal 233; E Greene and P-M 
Boury, ‘Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate Governance in Europe and the USA: Americanisation 
or Convergence?’ (2003) 1 International Journal of  Disclosure and Governance 21.
5 Eg R La Porta and others, ‘Law and Finance’ (1998) 106 Journal of  Political Economy 1113; 
R La Porta, F Lopez-de-Silanes and A Shleifer, ‘The Economic Consequences of  Legal Origins’ 
(2008) 46 Journal of  Economic Literature 285 (hereinafter ‘Legal Origins’); K Pistor, ‘Patterns 
of  Legal Change: Shareholder Protection and Creditor Rights in Transition Economies’ (2000) 
1 European Business Organization Law Review 59.
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structural changes in the shareholder protection index. Part E examines the 
strength of  shareholder protection according to groups of  countries, namely 
legal origins and stages of  economic development. Part F uses an analysis based 
on differences between individual observations in order to scrutinise questions 
of  convergence and similarities between legal systems. Based on all of  these 
findings, Part G then provides a concluding assessment of  the three aforemen-
tioned paradigms.
B. A LexImetrIc VIew of ShArehoLder ProtectIon
The research discussed here derives from a project on law, finance and devel-
opment at the Centre for Business Research (CBR) at the University of  
Cambridge. The project had the aim of  reviewing the mechanisms by which 
legal institutions influence financial systems and thereby affect economic devel-
opment. For this purpose, the CBR researchers constructed time-series datasets 
on shareholder protection (as well as creditor and worker protection)6 and used 
those data as explanatory variables in regression analysis.7 In addition, one 
of  us, together with other researchers, decided to write papers limited to the 
analysis of  the legal data, calling this approach “leximetric”.8 Thus, in these 
papers, the main interest was in a quantitative presentation of  cross-country 
similarities and differences in company law and how those may be interpreted.
In detail, the initial CBR project developed two indices on shareholder 
protection in listed companies. The first one had 60 variables, and the project 
members coded the laws of  five countries for the years 1970–2005. The second 
index reduced the number of  variables to 10 but coded 25 countries, initially 
for the years 1995–2005. The corresponding datasets have been made  available 
6 For papers discussing the relationship between those datasets see J Armour and others, ‘How 
Do Legal Rules Evolve? Evidence from a Cross-Country Comparison of  Shareholder, Creditor, 
and Worker Protection’ (2009) 57 American Journal of  Comparative Law 579; J Armour and 
others, ‘Law and Financial Development: What We are Learning from Time-Series Evidence’ 
(2009) BYU Law Review 1435; M Siems, ‘Convergence in Corporate Governance: A Leximetric 
Approach’ (2010) 45 The Journal of  Corporation Law 729; M Siems, ‘The Web of  Creditor 
and Shareholder Protection: A Comparative Legal Network Analysis’ (2010) 27 Arizona Journal 
of  International and Comparative Law 747.
7 Eg J Armour and others, ‘Shareholder Protection and Stock Market Development: An 
Empirical Test of  the Legal Origins Hypothesis’ (2009) 6 Journal of  Empirical Legal Studies 
359; D Katelouzou, ‘Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance and Corporate Law: An 
Empirical Analysis Across Twenty-Five Countries’ (PhD Thesis, University of  Cambridge 
2013). See also M Siems and S Deakin, ‘Comparative Law and Finance: Past, Present and 
Future Research’ (2010) 166 Journal of  Institutional and Theoretical Economics 120.
8 P Lele and M Siems, ‘Shareholder Protection: A Leximetric Approach’ (2007) 7 Journal 
of  Corporate Law Studies 17. This term was first used in RD Cooter and T Ginsburg, 
‘Leximetrics: Why the Same Laws are Longer in Some Countries than Others’ (2003) <www.
ssrn.com/abstract=456520>.
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on the project website, including detailed explanations of  the respective legal 
codings.9
The present article is the first one to present an extension of  this latter 
dataset, namely for 30 countries and the years 1990–2013. It is based on the 
coding of  the 10 variables in Table 1. The previous papers of  the project 
explained the selection of  the variables and the approach to coding the law in 
detail. While such choices do not deny the subjective element inherent in such 
9 See <www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/research-projects/completed-projects/law-finance-developments>.
Table 1: Ten-Variable Shareholder Protection Index
Variables Description
1. Powers of  the 
general meeting 
for de facto 
changes
If  the sale of  more than 50% of  the company’s assets requires approval of  
the general meeting it equals 1; if  the sale of  more than 80% of  the assets 
requires approval it equals 0.5; otherwise 0.
2. Agenda setting 
power
Equals 1 if  shareholders who hold 1% or less of  the capital can put an 
item on the agenda; equals 0.75 if  there is a hurdle of  more than 1% but 
not more than 3%; equals 0.5 if  there is a hurdle of  more than 3% but not 
more than 5%; equals 0.25 if  there is a hurdle of  more than 5% but not 
more than 10%; equals 0 otherwise.
3. Anticipation 
of  shareholder 
decision facilitated
Equals 1 if  (i) postal voting is possible or (ii) proxy solicitation with a 
two-way voting proxy form has to be provided by the company (ie the 
directors or managers); equals 0.5 if  (i) postal voting is possible if  provided 
in the articles or allowed by the directors or (ii) the company has to provide 
a two-way proxy form but not proxy solicitation; equals 0 otherwise.
4. Prohibition of  
multiple voting 
rights (super 
voting rights)
Equals 1 if  there is a prohibition of  multiple voting rights; equals 2/3 if  
only companies which already have multiple voting rights can keep them; 
equals 1/3 if  state approval is necessary; equals 0 otherwise. 
5. Independent 
board members
Equals 1 if  at least half  of  the board members must be independent; equals 
0.5 if  25% of  them must be independent; equals 0 otherwise
6. Feasibility of  
director’s dismissal
Equals 0 if  a good reason is required for the dismissal of  directors; 
equals 0.25 if  directors can always be dismissed but are always compen-
sated for dismissal without good reason; equals 0.5 if  directors are not 
always compensated for dismissal without good reason but they could have 
concluded a non-fixed-term contract with the company; equals 0.75 if  in 
cases of  dismissal without good reason directors are only compensated if  
compensation is specifically contractually agreed; equals 1 if  there are no 
special requirements for dismissal and no compensation has to be paid.
Note: If  there is a statutory limit on the amount of  compensation, this can 
lead to a higher score.
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datasets, it can be noted that they have been called “more sophisticated” than 
alternative datasets on shareholder protection.10
In the present article we analyse the 10 variables × 30 [countries] × 24 
[years] = 7,200 variables of  the new dataset. As with the previous datasets, 
detailed explanations of  the respective legal codings will be made available on 
the CBR project website.
The original contributions of  this article are as follows: first, it is based on 
a considerably richer dataset than previous ones. Compared to the first set of  
papers,11 which analysed the data for five countries, the coverage of  30 coun-
tries enables us to identify any possible differences between groups of  countries 
(say, common and civil law countries) in a more reliable way. The countries in 
our sample12 also provide a good mix of  developed and developing countries 
from different parts of  the world. Compared to the second set of  papers, we 
10 AM Pacces, ‘How Does Corporate Law Matter? “Law and Finance” and Beyond’ in M Faure 
and J Smits (eds), Does Law Matter? On Law and Economic Growth (Intersentia 2011) 297, 304.
11 This distinction refers to the difference between the first and the second shareholder protection 
index, see text accompanying n 9.
12 See n 17 below.
7. Private enforce-
ment of  director’s 
duties (derivative 
suit)
Equals 0 if  this is typically excluded (eg because of  strict subsidiarity 
requirement there is a hurdle which is at least 20%); equals 0.5 if  there are 
some restrictions (eg certain percentage of  share capital; demand require-
ment); equals 1 if  private enforcement of  directors duties is readily possible.
8. Shareholder 
action against 
resolutions of  the 
general meeting
Equals 1 if  every shareholder can file a claim against a resolution by the 
general meeting; equals 0.5 if  there is a threshold of  10% voting rights; 
equals 0 if  this kind of  shareholder action does not exist.
9. Mandatory bid Equals 1 if  there is a mandatory public bid for the entirety of  shares in 
case of  purchase of  30% or 1/3 of  the shares; equals 0.5 if  the manda-
tory bid is triggered at a higher percentage (such as 40 or 50%); further, it 
equals 0.5 if  there is a mandatory bid but the bidder is only required to 
buy part of  the shares; equals 0 if  there is no mandatory bid at all.
10. Disclosure 
of  major share 
ownership
Equals 1 if  shareholders who acquire at least 3% of  the company’s capital 
have to disclose it; equals 0.75 if  this concerns 5% of  the capital; equals 0.5 
if  this concerns 10%; equals 0.25 if  this concerns 25%; equals 0 otherwise.
Note on shading: we classified variables 2, 3, 6, 7, and 8 as “enabling” forms of  shareholder 
protection and variables 1, 4, 5, 9 and 10 as “paternalistic” forms (here highlighted). See the 
subsequent text for details.
Source: M Siems, ‘Shareholder Protection Around the World (“Leximetric II”)’ (2008) 33 Delaware 
Journal of  Corporate Law 111, 116–19.
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have increased the length of  the time series from 11 to 24 years;13 thus, iden-
tifying time trends can be achieved more fully. The period from 1990 to 2013 
is also interesting to examine as it includes events such as the transition to a 
market economy and the accession to the EU in some countries, as well the 
“dot-com bubble” and the global financial crisis.
Secondly, the present article is the first one that disaggregates the overall 
index into two subsets, “enabling” and “paternalistic”, that are forms of  share-
holder protection (see the footnote to Table 1). Therefore, this distinction refers 
to the substantive direction of  forms of  shareholder protection, not the formal 
difference between default and mandatory rules.14 By “enabling”, we mean 
legal tools that provide shareholders with certain powers, grant them certain 
rights or entitle them to certain actions, though it is up to the shareholders 
to decide whether or not to make use of  them—for example, the right to 
appoint a proxy or the ability to file a derivative claim. By contrast, “paternal-
istic” forms of  shareholder protection have the aim of  protecting shareholders 
in all circumstances; for example, when a law maker decides that it is up to 
the general meeting to take certain decisions or to prescribe that some board 
members need to be independent, it takes the paternalistic view that it knows 
what is best for shareholders.
Thirdly, this article uses some leximetric tools which go beyond those used 
previously. Both in the previous papers and the present one we show charts 
with aggregates of  variables. These can be useful, for example, in tracking 
changes in shareholder protection over time or in examining the relevance of  
country classifications. Yet this article also uses more sophisticated methods. For 
instance, in order to identify major shifts in a time series, we employ tests of  
change-point detection.15 In addition, an analysis of  country pairs according to 
differences between individual variables is used in order to identify clusters of  
countries based on network analysis.16 Such tools are used for the first time in 
the growing field of  quantitative comparative research in company law.
Fourthly, as explained in the introduction, this article focuses on the question 
of  whether established paradigms in comparative company law are still valid. 
This explicit research question is a distinct one of  the present leximetric paper. 
It is also an important question to be asked since the last 20 years have seen 
the apparent emergence of  such paradigms, yet they are often based on merely 
anecdotal evidence.
13 Note that the coding was done between May and November 2013. Thus, the 2013 data reflect 
slightly different points in time for different countries.
14 See also below Part D.2. 
15 See below Part D.
16 See below Part F.
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c. GenerAL deVeLoPment of ShArehoLder ProtectIon
1. Comparing Countries, Now and Then
To start with, it is helpful to examine how shareholder protection developed 
from 1990 to 2013. Fig 1 shows the aggregates of  all 10 variables of  the share-
holder protection index for each of  the countries in the initial and final years 
of  our sample.17 Shareholder protection in 1990 is plotted as vertical columns 
and shareholder protection in 2013 is plotted as a line. Comparing 1990 with 
2013, one can first see that every single country in our sample has raised its 
scoring in the last 13 years, with the average increase in the shareholder protec-
tion scores being 3.09 on a 10-point scale. It is notable that in 1990 the lowest 
score of  countries with a company law was 0.5 (Slovenia),18 while in 2013 it 
was 4.38 (Pakistan).
The magnitude of  the increase differs, however, as does the overall ranking 
of  the countries. The five countries with the biggest increase in shareholder 
protection over the 24-year period of  study are China (+7.85), Slovenia (+6.88), 
Russia (+5.6), the Netherlands (+5.5) and Estonia (+5.25). On the other hand, 
17 In this article we use the following abbreviations: AR (Argentina), BE (Belgium), BR (Brazil), 
CA (Canada), CH (Switzerland), CL (Chile), CN (China), CY (Cyprus), CZ (Czech Republic), 
DE (Germany), EE (Estonia), ES (Spain), FR (France), IN (India), IT (Italy), JP (Japan), LV 
(Latvia), LT (Lithuania), MX (Mexico), MY (Malaysia), NL (the Netherlands), PK (Pakistan), 
PL (Poland), RU (Russia), SE (Sweden), SI (Slovenia), TR (Turkey), UK (the United Kingdom), 
US (the United States) and ZA (South Africa).
18 This coded the law for Yugoslavia. As Fig 1 shows, China had a score of  0 in 1990, but 
this was because, prior to the Opinion for Joint-Stock Companies of  the State Restructuring 
Commission from 15 May 1992, China did not have a general company law but only some 
local company laws in the special administrative regions. The Law of  the People’s Republic of  
China on Industrial Enterprises Owned by the Whole People 1988 was not a company law in 
a modern sense (eg it did not have shareholders as outside investors).
9
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2013. Figure 1, below, shows the aggregates of all ten variables of the shareholder protection 
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ple has raised its scoring n the last 13 years, ith the average increase in t e shareholder pro-
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18 In this article we use the following abbreviations: AR (Argentina), BE (Belgium), BR (Brazil), CA 
(Canada), CH (Switzerland), CL (Chile), CN (China), CY (Cyprus), CZ (Czech Republic), DE (Ger-
many), EE (Es onia), ES (Spain), FR (France), IN (I dia), IT (Italy), JP (Japan), LV (Latvia), LT 
(Lithuania), MX (Mexico), MY (Malaysia), NL (the Netherl nds), PK (Pakistan), PL (Poland), RU 
(Russia), SE (Sweden), SI (Sl venia), TR (Turkey), UK (the United Kingdom), US (the United
States) and ZA (South Africa). 
19 This coded the law for Yugoslavia. As Figure 1 shows, China had a score of 0 in 1990 but this was 
due to the fact that prior to the Opinion for Joint-Stock Companies of the State Restructuring Com-
mission from 15 May 1992, China did not have a general company law but only some local company 
laws in the special administrative regions (SARs). The Law of the People’s Republic of China on In-
dustrial Enterprises Owned by the Whole People 1988 was not a company law in a modern sense (eg, 
it did not have shareholders as outside investors). 
Fig 1 Shareholder Protection in 30 Countries in 1990 and 2013
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the top countries in 1990, ie Malaysia, France, the US, the UK and Japan, have 
increased only slightly, by 0.93 on average. Furthermore, only three countries, ie 
China, Russia and France, have managed to rise higher than a score of  7.5 in 
2013. This possibly suggests that more shareholder protection is not necessarily 
better, and that company law should strive for optimum rather than maximum 
shareholder protection, ie it should aim to balance between the different groups 
that play a role in the governance of  companies.19 However, with the tools used 
in this article, we are unable to provide a normative assessment of  the distinc-
tion between maximum and optimum shareholder protection because it would 
require regression analysis to determine what level of  shareholder protection is 
indeed the most conducive for a country’s development.20
The overall ranking of  the countries has also changed. Of  the top five 
countries of  1990, only France, Malaysia and the UK are also at the top in 
2013, while the two most shareholder-protective countries in 2013 are China 
and Russia, which both have a score of  7.85. The jump in the Chinese score 
is mainly attributable to the adoption of  the Chinese Company Law 2005, 
which introduced some Western standards of  shareholder protection, such as a 
shareholder vote to approve large asset sales (variable 1), a 3 per cent threshold 
for setting an agenda item for the general meeting (variable 2), a “without 
cause” removal of  the management board (variable 6) and a general derivative 
action that can be raised by one per cent of  shareholders (variable 7).21 The 
increase in the Russian score, mainly due to the introduction of  the Joint Stock 
Company Law of  1995 and the Russian Corporate Governance Code of  2002, 
also indicates the influence of  Western standards on developing (and transition) 
economies.22 Similarly, Turkey revised its Commercial Code in 2011 to catch 
up with the developed world. Significant progress has also been made by many 
of  the countries in Eastern Europe, especially the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Latvia and Slovenia, driven in part by harmonisation with European law.23
This rapid movement towards more shareholder protection in most of  the 
transition and developing economies studied, combined with the more incre-
mental rise in the levels of  shareholder protection in more developed countries, 
led to some transition systems today having higher levels of  shareholder 
rights protection than some of  the most developed market economies, such 
19 Lele and Siems (n 8) 34. The role of  different groups of  stakeholders is also a prominent 
feature of  M Blair and L Stout, ‘A Team Production Theory of  Corporate Law’ (1999) 85 
Virginia Law Review 248.
20 For such research see, eg above (nn 5 and 7).
21 For a comparative analysis of  those development see also M Siems, Convergence in Shareholder Law 
(CUP 2008) 94, 158, 165 and 217.
22 K Pistor, M Raiser and S Gelfer, ‘Law and Finance in Transition Economies’ (2000) 8 Economics 
of  Transition 325, 327. Given its choice of  countries, the present article distinguishes between 
developed and developing countries, with the latter including transition economies. See also 
below Part E.
23 This concerns variables 9 and 10. See further below Part C.2.
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as Germany and Switzerland. In particular, it can be seen that the frequent 
company reforms in transition and developing countries tend to add new forms 
of  shareholder protection to existing ones: thus, in the terminology of  insti-
tutional research, our findings show that law reform and institutional change 
often do not lead to “replacement” (or “displacement”), but to the “layering” 
of  rules from various backgrounds.24
However, higher scores in the shareholder protection index do not necessarily 
imply that shareholders are more protected unless enforcement mechanisms are 
also in place. Theory suggests that “law in books” and “law in action” diverge, 
sometimes considerably.25 Thus it is revealing to display the relationship between 
the level of  shareholder protection (horizontal axis) and enforcement mech-
anisms (vertical axis) plotted in Fig 2. To measure the degree of  enforcement, 
we used the World of  Bank “rule of  law” ranking.26 Each of  the countries in 
24 See, eg K Thelen, ‘Institutional Change in Advanced Political’ (2009) 47 British Journal 
of  Industrial Relations 471; J Mahoney and K Thelen, ‘A Theory of  Gradual Institutional 
Change’ in J Mahoney and K Thelen (eds), Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and 
Power (CUP 2010) 1.
25 R Pound, ‘Law in Books and Law in Action’ (1910) 44 American Law Review 12; JL Halpérin, 
‘Law in Books and Law in Action: The Problem of  Legal Change’ (2011) 64 Maine Law 
Review 1. 
26 The World Bank Governance Indicators <databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variablesel-
ection/selectvariables.aspx?source=worldwide-governance-indicators>. Rule of  law measures 
“the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of  society, in particular 
the quality of  contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of  
crime and violence”.
12 
suggests that ‘“law in books’” and ‘“law in action’” diverge, sometimes considerably.26 Thus 
it is r vealing t  display the r lation b tween the level of shareholder protection (horizontal 
axis) and enforcement mechanisms (vertical axis) plotted in Figure 2. To measure the degree 
of enforcement we use the World of Bank ‘“rule of law’” ranking.27 Each of the countries in 
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2012.28
Fig. 2 Relationship between Shareholder Protection and Law Enforcement 
                                            
26 R Pound, ‘“Law in Books and Law in Action’” (1910) 44 American Law Review 12; JL Halpérin, 
‘“Law in Books and Law in Action: The Problem of Leg l Change’” (2011) 64 M ine Law Review 1.  
27 The World Bank Governance Indicators, available at <data-
bank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselection/selectvariables.aspx?source=worldwide-
governance-indicators>.. Rule of law measures ‘“the extent to which agents have confidence in and 
abide by the rules of society, in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence’”.
28 We examined these two years since these are the earliest and latest year for which both datasets are 
available. 
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our sample is plotted with a diamond marker in 1996 and with a rectangular 
marker in 2012.27
Fig 2 shows that developed countries have higher levels of  legal enforce-
ment than transition countries both in 1996 and in 2012. The most surprising 
aspect of  the substantial variation in law enforcement is that the high levels 
of  formal shareholder protection achieved in many transition economies in the 
2010s are not mirrored in improvements in the enforcement intensity. Although 
some transition countries, such as Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, made some 
progress, others remained almost unchanged or even got worse. Notably, the 
levels of  legal effectiveness of  China and Russia, the two countries with the 
highest scoring in the shareholder protection index in 2012, remained poor 
throughout the period of  study. We also find that there is no positive correla-
tion between the levels of  shareholder protection and the rule of  law either in 
1996 or in 2012.28 This evidence confirms previous research that formal legal 
change is not always sufficient to catalyse improvements in law in action.29 A 
likely explanation for this gap between law in books and law in action is that 
copying legal rules is easier than implementing them in the absence of  effec-
tive judiciary, trustworthy legal and administrative infrastructure, and efficient 
political and economic institutions.30
2. Development of  Different Tools of  Shareholder Protection
So far we have considered the level of  shareholder protection in particular 
points in time for each of  the sample jurisdictions. In this section and the 
next, we expand our analysis by making use of  the longitudinal nature of  the 
shareholder protection index and study variations of  shareholder protection 
across time. Fig 3 plots each of  the 10 variables in the index31 between 1990 
and 2013.
The 10 curves in Fig 3 demonstrate some common features. First of  all, in 
general, they all exhibit an upward movement, which means that on average 
the value of  every single variable in the index increased over time. The extent 
of  change differs, however, from one variable to another. Notably, variable 5, 
which codes the law on independent directors, underwent the most significant 
27 We examined these two years since they are the earliest and latest years for which both datasets 
are available.
28 The Pearson correlation coefficient between the shareholder protection index and the rule of  
law is 0.173 in 1996 and 0.131 in 2012 (not statistically significant).
29 Pistor and others (n 22) 344. 
30 See, eg B Black, R Kraakman and A Tarassova, ‘Russian Privatization and Corporate 
Governance: What Went Wrong?’ (2000) 52 Stanford Law Review 1731; D Berkowitz, K 
Pistor and JF Richard, ‘Economic Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect’ (2003) 47 
European Economic Review 165.
31 See above Part B. The precise data will also be made publicly available on the website, cited 
above (n 9).
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increase of  all. While in 1990 all the countries but the United States32 had the 
score 0 for variable 5, by 2013 every single sample jurisdiction had required 
at least one independent director to sit on corporate boards.33 The idea of  
32 For the United States, see New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) Manual B-23 (1966): at least two 
independent directors. 
33 See Decree 677/2001, art 15 and General Resolution 400/2002 by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (for Argentina); 2009 Belgian Corporate Governance Code, art 8.8; 1999 Code 
of  Best Practice of  Corporate Governance, revised in 2001, 2004 and 2009, item 2.12 (item 
2.16 in the 2009 version) (for Brazil)); Toronto Stock Exchange Manual, s 472(2); Corporate 
Governance Act 2009 (for Chile); 2001 Opinion issued by the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission and Company Law 2005, art 123; 2002 Cypriot Corporate Governance Code, art 
A.2; 2001 Czech Corporate Governance Code, ch IV; 2006 Estonian Corporate Governance 
Recommendations, s 3.3.2; 2003 French Corporate Governance Principles No 8.2 (now 9.2); 
2002 German Corporate Governance Code No 5.4.2; 1998 Voluntary Code: The Confeder-
ation of  Indian Industries, Recommendation 2; 1999 Preda Code (revised in 2002 and 2011), 
art 3 and 2004 Civil Code, arts 2384cc and art 2409 (for Italy)); Companies Act, art 400(3) 
and Tokyo Stock Exchange Listing Regulations (2009), Rule 436-2 (for Japan); 2005 Principles 
of  Corporate Governance, s 8.6 (2010 revised version s 7.6) (for Latvia); 2003 Lithuanian 
Corporate Governance Code, Principle III; Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance, pt 
II and 2001 and 2001 Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) (now the Bursa Malaysia 
since 2004) 3.04; Code of  Best Corporate Governance Practices (1999) p 7 and 2005 Stock 
Market Act, art 24 (for Mexico); Tabaksblat code (2004) s III.2.1 (for the Netherlands); Code 
of  Corporate Governance 2002 revised in 2012 (for Pakistan); The Code of  Best Practice for 
Pubic Companies 2002 (and 2005 as amended) pt 17 (for Poland); 2002 Russian Corporate 
Governance Code, ch 3, s 2.2 and Decree of  the Federal Commission for Securities Market 
No 03-1169/r of  18 June 2003; 2005 (and 2007) Slovenian Corporate Governance Code, s 
3.3.1, 2009 Corporate Governance Code and Company Law (ZGD-1), Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange (JSE) Listing Requirements, rule 3.84 and King III Report (2009) (for South Africa); 
Aldama Report (2003) 2.1.c, Companies Act 2010, art 538 and Unified Code of  Corporate 
Governance (for Spain); Swedish Code of  2004, 3.2.4; 2002 Code of  Best Practice issued by 
Economie Suisse, s IIb, § 12 (for Switzerland); 2003 Turkish Corporate Governance Code 3.3 (for 
Turkey); Code of  Best Practice 1992, s 2.2 and Combined Code 2003, A.3.2 (currently UK 
Corporate Governance Code of  2012, B.1) (for the UK); Listed Company Manual of  the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE Manual) B-23 (1966) and 2002 NYSE Manual § 303A.01. 
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32 See above, Ssection B. The precise data will also be made publicly available on the website, cited 
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independent directors.  
34 See Article art 15 of Decree 677/2001 and General Resolution 400/2002 by the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (for Argentina); 2009 Belgian Corporate Governance Code, Article art 8.8; 1999 
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directors’ independence has been emphasised since the mid-1990s, when policy 
makers started to advocate independent directors as a way of  providing a more 
effective check on management, while in the post-Enron era codes of  corporate 
governance have spread quickly throughout the world, aimed, among others, at 
enhancing the role of  independent directors.34
The values of  variables 9 (mandatory bid) and 10 (disclosure of  major 
share ownership) have also increased significantly during the sample period.35 
It is noteworthy that both rules have been subject to European harmonisation. 
Regarding variable 9, the Directive on takeover bids, adopted in 2004 provides 
under article 5 that if  a person, acting individually or in concert with other 
persons, acquires control over a company, he or she is obliged to make a full 
takeover bid for all the remaining voting securities of  this company and offer 
the same terms to all shareholders (mandatory bid rule).36 Several EU Member 
States (in our sample, Belgium, Cyprus, Latvia and the Netherlands) introduced 
a mandatory bid obligation implementing the Takeover Directive,37 while Lith-
uania and Spain lowered the threshold for mandatory bids to one-third and 
30%, respectively, after adoption of  the Takeover Directive.38
As for variable 10, the 2004 Transparency Directive, which superseded the 
1998 Large Holdings Directive, tightened up the disclosure rules for significant 
holdings and set the disclosure threshold at 5 per cent.39 However, all of  the 
EU Member States in our sample except Estonia had their disclosure threshold 
set at 5 per cent before the implementation of  the Transparency Directive in 
2007. This could suggest that changes in the ownership disclosure rules of  EU 
Member States do not merely reflect European Union harmonisation efforts.40
In contrast to variables 5, 9 and 10, which have undergone significant 
change since 1990, variable 6 (feasibility of  director’s dismissal) has remained, 
on average, almost unchanged between 1990 and 2013.41 Variables 1 (powers 
of  the general meeting for de facto changes) and 4 (prohibition of  multiple 
34 See, eg RV Aguilera, ‘Corporate Governance and Director Accountability: an Institutional 
Comparative Perspective’ (2005) 16 British Journal of  Management 39.
35 Between 1990 and 2013, variables 9 and 10 increased by 0.59 and 0.43 on a 1-point scale, 
respectively.
36 art 5 of  Directive 2004/25/EC on takeover bids [2004] OJ L142/12.
37 For Belgium see, of  the Law of  1 April 2007 on public takeovers (Loi relative aux offres 
publiques d’acquisition), art 5; for Cyprus, Law 41[I]/2007, art 13; for Latvia, Law of  the 
Financial Instrument Market 2004 (in effect since 13 July 2006), art 66; for the Netherlands, 
Financial Supervision Act, s 5:70(1).
38 For Lithuania see Law on Securities Market (amended in 2007), art 31; for Spain, Stock Market 
Act 1998, arts 60 et seq, Royal Decree1066/2007 and Note 8/2008 issued by the National 
Securities and Exchange Commission. 
39 art 9 of  Directive 2004/109/EC on the harmonisation of  transparency requirements in relation 
to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market and 
amending Directive 2001/34/EG [2004] OJ L390/38.
40 MC Schouten and MM Siems, ‘The Evolution of  Ownership Disclosure Rules’ (2010) 10 
Journal of  Corporate Law Studies 451, 463–64.
41 Variable 6 increased by 0.05 on a 1-point scale over the 24-year period of  study.
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voting rights) also remained relatively unchanged over the 24-year period of  
study,42 while variable 8 (shareholder action against the general meeting), which 
displays the highest scores throughout the 24-year period of  study, did not 
change at all after 2002.43
d. ShArehoLder ProtectIon tIme SerIeS AnALySIS
1. Overall Shareholder Protection
Despite differences in the magnitude and pace of  increase among the 10 vari-
ables of  the shareholder protection index, the overall level of  legal protection 
afforded by law to shareholders in our sample countries has been increasing 
since 1990. This is also evident in the left panel of  Fig 4, which graphically 
displays the aggregate of  the 10 shareholder protection variables between 1990 
and 2013.44 This trend challenges the view that the development of  company 
law is path-dependent insofar as we provide evidence that substantial differ-
ences in legal shareholder protection have been fading away over the last three 
decades.
The literature on institutions often discusses the dichotomy of  institutional 
development. For example, it is said that such development is characterised “by 
42 Between 1990 and 2013, both variables 1 and 4 increased by 0.183 on a 1-point scale.
43 Variable 8 has an average score of  0.904 on a 1-point scale between 2002 and 2013.
44 Note that, in order to show this change most clearly, the y-axis of  Fig 4 displays the values 
from 3 to 7. See also L Epstein and AD Martin, An Introduction to Empirical Legal Research (OUP 
2014) 253–54 (explaining why there are good reasons not always to start scales at zero).
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Fig. 4 Shareholder protection aggregate (left) and first difference of (ln) shareholder protec-
tion (right) 
The literature on institutions often discusses the dichotomy of institutional development. 
For example, it is said that such development is characterised ‘“by relatively long periods of 
path-dependent institutional stability and reproduction that are punctuated occasionally by 
brief phases of institutional flux’”,46 that there are the views that emphasise either the ‘“dy-
namic of endogenously generated change’” or the ‘“responses to external shocks’”,47 and po-
sitions that focus on either ‘“the deliberate creation of institutions through the political pro-
cess’” or ‘“the spontaneous emergence of institutions through evolutionary processes’”.48
The time dimension of the shareholder protection dataset enables a closer scrutiny of its 
institutional development. In particular, it can be examined whether there are any specific 
turning points, also known as ‘“structural breaks’” or ‘“change-points’”, in the development 
                                                 
46 G Capoccia and RD Kelemen, ‘“The Study of Critical Junctures Theory, Narrative, and Counterfac-
tuals in Historical Institutionalism’” (2007) 59 World Politics 341. 
47 PA Hall and K Thelen, ‘“Institutional Change in Varieties of Capitalism’” (2009) 7 Socio-
Economic Review 7, 16. 
48 C Kingston and G Caballero, ‘“Comparing Theories of Institutional Change’” (2009) 5 Journal of 
Institutional Economics 151. 
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46 G Capoccia and RD Kelemen, ‘“The Study of Critical Junctures Theory, Narrative, and Counterfac-
tuals in Historical Institutionalism’” (2007) 59 World Politics 341. 
47 PA Hall and K Thelen, ‘“Institutional Change in Varieties of Capitalism’” (2009) 7 S cio-
Ec nomic Review 7, 16. 
48 C Kingston and G Caballero, ‘“Comparing Theories of Institutional Change’” (2009) 5 Journal of 
Institutional Economics 151. 
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relatively long periods of  path-dependent institutional stability and reproduction 
that are punctuated occasionally by brief  phases of  institutional flux”,45 that 
there are views that emphasise either the “dynamic of  endogenously generated 
change” or the “responses to external shocks”,46 and that positions focus on 
either “the deliberate creation of  institutions through the political process” or 
“the spontaneous emergence of  institutions through evolutionary processes”.47
The time dimension of  the shareholder protection dataset enables a closer 
scrutiny of  its institutional development. In particular, it can be examined 
whether there are any specific turning points, also known as “structural breaks” 
or “change-points”, in the development of  shareholder protection over the 
24-year period of  study.48 It could then be possible to link such a turning point 
to a particular exogenous event that is likely to be responsible for the change.49 
For instance, there has been a considerable debate on the relationship between 
shareholder protection and the financial crisis of  2008.50 Shareholder propon-
ents claim that the financial crisis was at least in part a result of  inadequate 
management accountability to shareholders and advocate that increased share-
holder power will ensure better monitoring of  management performance and 
thereby improve firm value.51 Shareholder empowerment opponents, however, 
suggest that increased shareholder power did not prevent excessive risk-taking, 
especially by banks, in advance of  the financial crisis.52
45 G Capoccia and RD Kelemen, ‘The Study of  Critical Junctures Theory, Narrative, and 
Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism’ (2007) 59 World Politics 341.
46 PA Hall and K Thelen, ‘Institutional Change in Varieties of  Capitalism’ (2009) 7 Socio-
Economic Review 7, 16.
47 C Kingston and G Caballero, ‘Comparing Theories of  Institutional Change’ (2009) 5 Journal 
of  Institutional Economics 151.
48 It is noteworthy that detecting a change-point in a time series is different from identifying a 
“critical juncture”, a concept that has been introduced by the literature on institutional change. 
Whereas a change-point in a time series can be understood as the time location at which 
the parameter(s) of  the data generating process change abruptly, a critical juncture refers to 
“relatively short periods of  time during which there is a substantially heightened probability 
that agents’ choices will affect the outcome of  interest”. See Cappocia and Keleman (n 46) 348. 
It is also important to note that a change-point divides a time series into two segments, with 
each segment having exactly or approximately constant parameter values.
49 This is different from regression analysis that would, based on a priori reasoning, specify a 
particular year and then test whether there was a significant effect for this year.
50 See, eg J Mukwiri and M Siems, ‘The Financial Crisis: A Reason to Improve Shareholder 
Protection in the EU?’ (2014) 41 Journal of  Law and Society 51; A Dignam, ‘The Future of  
Shareholder Democracy in the Shadow of  the Financial Crisis’ (2013) 36 Seattle University 
Law Review 639; A Reisberg, ‘Shareholder Value after the Financial Crisis: A Dawn of  a New 
Era?’ (2013) 10 International Corporate Rescue 143.
51 See, eg LA Bebchuk, ‘The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value’ (2013) 113 
Columbia Law Review 1637.
52 See, eg BW Bratton and WL Wachter, ‘The Case against Shareholder Empowerment’ (2010) 
158 University of  Pennsylvania Law Review 653; D Ferreira and others, ‘Shareholder Empow-
erment and Bank Bailouts’ (2012) ECGI Finance Working Paper No 345/2013; Asian Finance 
Association 2013 Conference <www.ssrn.com/abstract=2170392>.
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Change-point detection in time series has received considerable attention in 
various fields, including statistics, finance, marketing and economic history.53 A 
classical test for mean change detection is the Chow test. This test in effect uses 
an F-test to determine whether the mean of  the sample remains stable between 
the two segments split by the change-point. The method, however, requires that 
the change-point is known to the user.
To eliminate the linear trend (left panel of  Fig 4), we analyse the first differ-
ences of  the natural logarithm (ln) of  the shareholder protection data, which 
we denote by Xt = ln(spt) – ln(spt – 1), where sp is the shareholder protection 
series. The series Xt is plotted in the right panel of  Fig 4 and has a length 
of  T = 23. In unreported results, we ran the Chow test for change-points in 
the mean and for every possible year in the data set Xt. The highest F-statistic 
(11.237) was obtained for t = 17 (ie year 2007) and the low p-value (0.0003) 
indicates that the change-point is statistically significant.
For robustness, we also apply a CUSUM statistic in the mean of  the series 
Xt, as an alternative method to detect a change-point in a time series.54 The 
advantage of  this method is that no a priori knowledge about the possible 
location of  the change-point is required. A CUSUM statistic is a cumulative 
sum of  terms and the highest value (in absolute terms) of  the CUSUM statistic 
indicates that a possible change-point exists.55 The first step of  the procedure 
is to find the most likely location b for a change-point. We locate such a point 
among b ∈ {1,…, T –1} as the one which maximises the following:
Y b1,T = factor × |(mean of  the sample from T = 1 up to b) – (mean of  the 
sample from b + 1 up to T = 23)|.56
53 For a review of  the econometric literature on change-points see BE Hansen, ‘The New Econo-
metrics of  Structural Change: Dating Breaks in U.S. Labor Productivity’ (2001) 15 The Journal 
of  Economic Perspectives 117. For a recent review of  change-point detection methods see KK 
Korkas and P Fryzlewicz, ‘Multiple Change-point Detection for Non-stationary Time Series 
Using Wild Binary Segmentation’ (2014) Joint Statistical Meetings (JSM) 2013 <personal.lse.
ac.uk/KORKAS/WBS_LSW.pdf>.
54 For an application in economic history see O Christodoulaki, H Cho and P Fryzlewicz, ‘A 
Reflection of  History: Fluctuations in Greek Sovereign Risk between 1914 and 1929’ (2012) 
16 European Review of  Economic History 550 (detecting change-points in the variance and 
not in the mean of  the time series of  interest). 
55 Due to the small sample size (T = 23), we do not consider multiple change-points in Xt. Hence, 
we do not rule out the possibility of  multiple change-points.
56 Or, in a more mathematical way,
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When the procedure described above was applied to Xt, it returned b = 
17 (2007) as a change-point, in the sense that it represented the maximum 
difference of  the mean of  Xt. For robustness, we also conducted a t-test for 
differences in the means of  the two segments, X1991–2006 (segment 1) and X2007–2013 
(segment 2).57 The means of  the two segments are graphically displayed in the 
right panel of  Fig 4 by the two horizontal lines. The t-test confirms that the 
mean of  the shareholder protection development (Xt) between 2007 and 2013 
is lower than that between 1991 and 2006 (p = 0.002).
Both the Chow test and the CUSUM-type change-point detection show 
evidence of  a shift in the shareholder protection in 2007, in the sense that 2007 
represents the end point of  a segment over which the mean of  the shareholder 
protection time series was constant. The vertical line in the right panel of  Fig 
4 displays the change-point as estimated by the two tests.
The statistical analysis indicates that although the shareholder protection 
time series follows an increasing trend throughout the period of  study, 2007 
represents a change-point after which the development of  shareholder protec-
tion decelerates. Putting these findings into the perspective of  the financial 
crisis, it is evident that, despite intensified calls for strengthening minority share-
holder rights and several legislative measures followed in turn,58 the overall level 
of  shareholder protection did not dramatically change in the years following 
the crisis. One possible explanation could be that shareholder protection had 
already jumped to an “optimum level” by 2007 and therefore little change 
took place afterwards.59 A related explanation comes from Brian Cheffins, 
who suggests that, with the possible exception of  large firms in the financial 
sector, corporate governance did not fail during the 2008 financial crisis.60 Even 
though the corporate governance mechanisms in place, among which were 
minority shareholder protection and the associated shareholder activism, did 
not prevent the crisis from happening, strengthening shareholder powers does 
not guarantee that shareholders will use the powers made available to them to 
prevent a future crisis. Accordingly, the main focus of  post-crisis policy reform 
switched to other topics, such as the corporate governance of  banks, the risks 
of  innovative financial instruments, the role of  securitisation (eg mortgage and 
asset-backed securities) and the rules on bail-outs/-ins.
57 The shareholder protection time series does not have autocorrelation, in which case there is no 
concern raised with regard to the t-test, which assumes independent variables.
58 In the US, for instance, the Delaware General Corporation Law and the Model Business 
Corporation Act were amended to allow corporations to provide for majority (rather than 
plurality) voting with the election of  directors. See, eg SM Bainbridge, Corporate Governance after 
the Financial Crisis (OUP 2012) 216–20. 
59 See above Part C.1.
60 BR Cheffins, ‘Did Corporate Governance “Fail” During the 2008 Stock Market Meltdown? 
The Case of  the S&P 500’ (2009) 65 Business Lawyer 1.
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2. Enabling v Paternalistic Protection
Another type of  comparison involves disaggregating the overall index into the 
enabling and paternalistic forms of  shareholder protection.61 It can be seen 
in Fig 5 that both forms of  shareholder protection have increased, albeit at 
different rates. Thus, in terms of  the literature on institutional change,62 we 
observe a “layering” of  multiple forms of  shareholder protection, not a replace-
ment of  one type of  shareholder protection by another.
A striking pattern that emerges is that paternalistic shareholder protection 
has increased considerably, whereas enabling shareholder protection has not 
changed much. The increase in the paternalistic form of  shareholder protec-
tion is mainly attributable to variables 5, 9 and 10, the values of  which, as we 
have seen above, underwent the most significant increases between 1990 and 
2013.63 Considering the 30 countries, all of  them are more paternalistic in 
2013 than in 1990, and for 25 of  them the increase in the paternalistic vari-
ables is larger than the respective increase in the enabling ones.64
This result may be unexpected if  one assumes that (i) the enabling variant 
is typical of  the US model of  corporate law and (ii) there has been US influ-
ence on other countries’ company law in recent years. With respect to point (i), 
it is important to note that the two categories of  shareholder protection intro-
61 See above Part B.
62 See the references in n 24.
63 See above Part C.2.
64 The exceptions are Belgium, Brazil, Japan, Malaysia and the US.
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64 See above, Ssection C.2. 
65 The exceptions are Belgium, Brazil, Japan, Malaysia, and the US. 
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duced by the present article distinguish according to the substantive direction 
of  forms of  shareholder protection,65 not the formal nature of  those rules.66 
The debate about the formal nature of  rules of  company law relates to the 
well-known distinction between the US model, which is associated with the 
view of  the company as a mere “nexus of  contracts”,67 and the continental 
European model, which has an emphasis on the statutorily fixed nature of  the 
company, with the company being regarded as an “institution”, “fiction” or 
“real person”.68 But in substantive terms, too, it is possible that US corporate 
law is different from other legal systems.
Our data confirm this first aspect: the US has high aggregates for the 
enabling variables, of  between 4 and 4.25 (compared with the average share-
holder protection in the left panel of  Fig 4), while the aggregates for the 
paternalistic variables are only between 2.25 and 3. This may therefore reflect 
that, in substance, US corporate law is relatively “business friendly” because it 
does not present many hurdles to companies and their directors.69 By contrast, 
US securities law tends to be more paternalistic. Some of  these rules address 
topics that in other countries would be part of  company law, for example the 
rules on independent directors.70 Moreover, if  one considered not only share-
holder protection but the law as it applies to companies more generally, recent 
federal laws (eg the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act and 2010 Dodd-Frank Act) may 
show that “legal paternalism” can be a prominent feature of  US business law.71
The second aspect about the Americanisation of  the law is one of  the para-
digms this article aims to scrutinise.72 Here, the shareholder protection data 
point to a different direction since the US preference for enabling variables 
is contrary to the trend shown in Fig 5. It may also be plausible that the 
65 See above Part B.
66 For those see, eg R Kraakman and others, The Anatomy of  Corporate Law: A Comparative and 
Functional Approach (2nd edn, OUP 2009) 19–27 (for a discussion about law versus contract in 
corporate law); BR Cheffins, Company Law: Theory, Structure, and Operation (OUP 1997) 31–46 
(distinguishing between permissive, presumptive and mandatory rules).
67 This view goes back to EF Fama, ‘Agency Problems and the Theory of  the Firm’ (1980) 88 
Journal of  Political Economy 288; FH Easterbrook and DR Fischel, The Economic Structure of  
Corporate Law (Harvard University Press 1996). 
68 For those conceptions see, eg NHD Foster, ‘Company Law Theory in Comparative Perspective: 
England and France’ (2000) 48 American Journal of  Comparative Law 573; Siems (n 21) 47.
69 This is often related to the role of  regulatory competition in US corporate law. See, eg R 
Romano, The Genius of  American Corporate Law (AEI Press 1993) 39–40.
70 In the shareholder protection index, the US aggregate of  paternalistic variables considers the 
high US score in variable 5 on independent directors (since 2003 half  of  the board members 
have to be independent according to NYSE Manual, § 303A.01 approved by the SEC, 
SR-NYSE-2002-33 and SR-NASD-2002-141, 68 Fed Reg 64154).
71 To be sure, this is also heavily criticised: eg R Romano, ‘The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the 
Making of  Quack Corporate Governance’ (2005) 114 Yale Law Journal 1521; SM Bainbridge, 
‘Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance Round II’ (2010–11) 95 Minnesota Law 
Review 1779. More generally see RegData, available www.regdata.org, said to be “an innovative 
new way of  measuring the size and scope of  US federal regulation”.
72 See above Part A.
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paternalistic form of  shareholder protection has seen a larger increase in most 
countries. In a recent monograph, Marc Moore explains that the conventional 
US model in which private preferences are the key consideration for company 
law rules is too narrow in today’s world.73 Since all legal systems have to accept 
that the effectiveness of  private ordering at the individual firm level has its 
inherent limitations, state interventionism is inevitable. Moore relates this to the 
normative view that company laws should be “coercive and socially-determi-
native, aimed at eliciting direct change in the behavioural patterns and relative 
resources of  key corporate participants in line with . . . society”.74 Our empir-
ical results can be interpreted as a confirmation of  this position, namely that 
law makers indeed take the view that it is acceptable to get actively involved 
in prescribing some rules that matter for a sound company law. In particular, 
this may be the case as far as they feel the need to intervene after abuses of  
power in corporate governance, such as in the transition economies of  Eastern 
Europe in the 1990s.75 It may also find a more general confirmation in the 
view that today we very much live in an age of  “regulatory capitalism”;76 thus, 
even capitalist societies have a tendency to increase the use of  regulatory law 
in recent decades.
The results of  Fig 5 should also be read in conjunction with Fig 6, which 
displays graphically the results of  the change-point analysis for the first differ-
ences of  the natural logarithm (ln) of  enabling (left panel) and paternalistic 
(right panel) forms of  shareholder protection. To detect change-points in the 
mean of  the two time series of  interest, we perform both the Chow test and 
the CUSUM method.77 For enabling shareholder protection, both tests reveal 
a change-point in 1996, which is displayed as a vertical line in the left panel 
of  Fig 6.78 Taking these findings together with the moderate increasing trend 
of  enabling shareholder protection since 1990 (Fig 5), it can be suggested that 
the 2000s was mostly a period of  stability for the development of  the enabling 
shareholder protection. It is therefore questionable whether an Americanisation 
of  company law has taken place in the last decade. For paternalistic share-
holder protection, we find a change-point in 2007, displayed as a vertical line 
73 MT Moore, Corporate Governance in the Shadow of  the State (Hart Publishing 2013). See also 
MT Moore, ‘Private Ordering and Public Policy: The Paradoxical Foundations of  Corporate 
Contractarianism’ (2014) 34 Oxford Journal of  Legal Studies 693 (discussing UK corporate 
governance).
74 ibid 4.
75 See Black and others (n 30). See also above Part E.
76 See, eg J Braithwaite, Regulatory Capitalism: How It Works, Ideas for Making It Work Better (Edward 
Elgar 2008); D Levi-Faur, ‘Varieties of  Regulatory Capitalism: Getting the Most Out of  the 
Comparative Method’ (2006) 19 Governance 367.
77 See above Part D.1.
78 In unreported results we run the Chow test for change-points in the mean and for every 
possible year in the enabling shareholder protection data set. The highest F-statistic (6.898) was 
obtained for 1996 and the p-value (0.015) indicates that the change-point is statistically signif-
icant. The CUSUM-type change-point detection also returned 1996 as the only change-point.
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in the right panel of  Fig 6.79 This finding, together with the growth of  pater-
nalistic shareholder protection in the 2000s (Fig 5), demonstrates that recent 
developments focused on paternalistic rather than enabling tools of  shareholder 
protection, and this resulted in company law being more paternalistic than 
enabling today.
Another way to analyse the possible influence of  particular models of  
company law is to scrutinise the relevance (if  any) of  legal origins and other 
group differences between countries. This will be done in the following section.
e. deVeLoPment AccordInG to GrouPS of countrIeS
1. Legal Origin and Shareholder Protection
For the last two decades, four financial economists, Rafael La Porta, Florencio 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, often referred to as 
LLSV, and an array of  co-authors and independent scholars have drawn upon 
the work of  prominent traditional comparatists to group countries into legal 
traditions or origins,80 and documented pervasive correlations between cross-
79 After performing the Chow test in the mean and for every possible year in the paternalistic 
shareholder protection data set, the highest F-statistic (16.149) was obtained for 2007 (p = 
0.001). Similarly, the CUSUM-type change-point detection returned 2008 as the only change-
point.
80 R David and JEC Brierley, Major Legal Systems in the World Today: An Introduction to the Comparative 
Study of  Law (Stevens and Sons 1985); TH Reynolds and AA Flores, A Foreign Law Current Sources 
of  Codes and Basic Legislation in Jurisdictions of  the World (Rothman 1989); K Zweigert and H Kötz, 
An Introduction to Comparative Law (3rd edn, OUP 1998). 
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77 See, eg J Braithwaite, Regulatory Capitalism: How It Works, Ideas for Making It Work Better.
(EdwardCheltenham: Elgar 2008); D Levi-Faur, ‘“Varieties of Regulatory Capitalism: Getting the 
Most Out of the Comparative Method’” (2006) 19 Governance 367. 
78 See above, Ssection D.1. 
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country differences in legal origin, on the one hand, and investor (shareholder 
and creditor) protection, regulation of  labour markets, government owner-
ship of  banks, entry regulations, firm valuation and numerous other spheres 
of  economic activity, on the other.81 In their seminal “Law and Finance” 
article, LLSV classified 49 countries into two broad legal origins or legal 
families—common law (English legal origin) and civil law (French, German 
and Scandinavian legal origin)—and argued that shareholder protection varies 
systematically across countries, with English legal origin countries providing 
more shareholder protection than countries with a civil law origin, and in 
particular a French legal origin, do.82 Subsequent studies conducted by three 
of  the authors (LLS) and Simeon Djankov include an additional sub-category 
of  socialist legal origin within civil law.83
Adopting the LLS/Djankov classification, we group our sample countries 
into four legal origins: English, French, German and socialist.84 Of  our sample 
of  30 countries, there are eight English common law countries (Canada, 
Cyprus, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, South Africa, the UK and the US), 10 
French civil law countries (Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, France, Italy, 
Mexico, the Netherlands, Spain and Turkey) and four German civil law coun-
tries (Germany, Japan, Sweden85 and Switzerland). We also retain the category 
of  socialist law which emerged from the Soviet Union and was spread to 
former Soviet Republics (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Russia) and Eastern 
European countries (Czech Republic, Poland and Slovenia), while it was also 
imitated by other countries, such as China.
Fig 7 presents the shareholder protection of  our sample countries with refer-
ence to the legal origin of  English, French, German and socialist law. First 
of  all, each of  the legal families has a higher score in the general level of  
shareholder protection over time. However, despite this general rising trend of  
shareholder protection, there are certain differences in the pattern of  change 
81 For a review of  the economic literature see La Porta and others, ‘Legal Origins’ (n 5) 286.
82 La Porta and others, ‘Law and Finance’ (n 5) 1117–79 and 1133–34. A corresponding finding 
is S Djankov and others, ‘The Law and Economics of  Self-Dealing’ (2008) 88 Journal of  
Financial Economics 430 (reconsidering the initial LLSV index as well as using another index 
for a director’s self-dealing transaction).
83 See, eg R La Porta, F Lopez-de-Silanes and A Shleifer, ‘Government Ownership of  Banks’ 
(2002) 57 Journal of  Finance 265; S Djankov and others, ‘Courts’ (2003) 118 Quarterly Journal 
of  Economics 453. On the category of  socialist law see also La Porta and others, ‘Legal 
Origins’ (n 5) 288. 
84 It is important to emphasise that the classification of  our sample countries to four legal families 
is only used for comparing our results with LLSV’s studies. For an analysis of  the shortcomings 
of  the legal origins/families distinction see, eg M Siems, ‘Legal Origins: Reconciling Law & 
Finance and Comparative Law’ (2007) 52 McGill Law Journal 55, 62–70. More generally see 
also S Deakin and K Pistor (eds), Legal Origin Theory (Edward Elgar 2012).
85 Although Sweden was treated by LLSV as part of  the Scandinavian civil law tradition, we 
choose not to keep the Scandinavian legal origin as a separate legal family (with one member) 
for present purposes and we categorise Sweden as a German-origin system. See similarly 
Armour and others, ‘Law and Financial Development’ (n 6) 1473, fn 119.
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between the four legal families. In particular, while the English-origin systems 
exhibited a greater general level of  shareholder protection than civil-origin 
systems over the period 1990–2000, civil-origin systems showed a remarkable 
increase over the same period, and after 2000 they started to catch up with 
their common law counterparts.
A considerable increase in shareholder protection is particularly marked in 
countries with a socialist legal origin. Indeed, in 1990, socialist legal origin 
countries had the lowest aggregate value of  the shareholder protection index 
(1.562), while in 2013 they scored the highest of  all four legal families (6.717).86 
The very low scores in the shareholder protection index of  this legal family in 
the early 1990s can be attributed to the lack of  fully fledged company laws in 
many socialist countries. For instance, the People’s Republic of  China did not 
have any formal national company law until 1992.87 The other socialist coun-
tries have also made substantial efforts to strengthen shareholder protection 
since the inception of  economic liberalisation in the mid-1990s, introducing 
company law reforms and adopting Western standards of  company law. For 
the socialist countries which are now members of  the European Union (Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia), the rise in the level 
of  shareholder protection is also part of  the European harmonisation process.88
Socialist legal origin countries might offer greater shareholder protection 
on paper since 2006 than English legal origin countries do, but formal legal 
86 It is noteworthy that the three countries with the biggest increase in shareholder protection over 
the period 1990–2013, ie China, Slovenia and Russia, belong to the category of  Socialist legal 
origin. See above Part C.1.
87 See above (n 18) and accompanying text.
88 See above Part C.1 and 2. See also below Part F.
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86 Although Sweden was tre ted by LLSV as part of the Scandinavian civil law tr dition, we choose 
not to ke p the Scandinavian legal origin as a separate legal family (with one member) for present 
purposes and we categorise Sweden as a German-origin system. See similarly Armour and others, 
Law and Financial Development, above n 6, 1473, fn 119. 
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change towards more shareholder protective rules does not necessarily imply 
better shareholder protection. First of  all, it should be remembered that the 
efficacy of  shareholder protection rules is a function not only of  their substan-
tive content, but also of  their enforcement. Indeed, there is no positive 
correlation between the levels of  formal shareholder protection as measured 
by the shareholder protection index and legal effectiveness as measured by the 
rule of  law.89 However, when we focus on socialist legal origin countries, we do 
find a negative and statistically significant correlation between the rule of  law 
and the level of  shareholder protection.90 Thus, it may be argued that formal 
shareholder protection and enforcement operate as substitute mechanisms in 
socialist countries: countries that lack an efficient judicial enforcement and non-
legal enforcement resources (eg self-regulatory institutions) may develop strong 
formal shareholder protection laws in order to provide at least some safeguard 
of  owners’ rights.91 Alternatively, it can be suggested that, due to their weak-
nesses in terms of  rule of  law, these countries feel the need to signal to foreign 
investors that they have decent shareholder protection, even if  this is more a 
form of  window dressing.92
It is also noteworthy that, even if  we group the shareholder protection 
vari ables into enabling and paternalistic forms of  shareholder protection, the 
overall picture does not change much. English legal origin countries used to 
offer more enabling and paternalistic shareholder protection in the 1990s, but 
this has changed now. There has been a fairly constant increase in enabling 
shareholder protection throughout the period of  study, and all legal families 
now score more than 3 points on a 5-point scale.93 As for paternalistic share-
holder protection, socialist countries have scored the highest of  all legal families 
since 2006.94
What do these findings tell us about the legal origins theory? First and 
foremost, it can be seen that belonging to a particular legal origin does not 
prevent the strengthening of  shareholder protection, especially in civil law 
countries. In fact, all three civil law families had a faster rate of  increase 
than the English common law one over the 24-year period of  study.95 These 
89 See above Part C.1.
90 The Pearson correlation coefficient between the shareholder protection index and the rule of  
law in Socialist legal origin countries is -0.933 (p = 0.01) in 1996 and -0.820 (p = 0.05) in 2012.
91 See also below Part E.2 (text accompanying nn 105 and 106).
92 We are grateful to Gerhard Schnyder for this suggestion.
93 In 2013, the enabling shareholder protection in English, French, German and socialist legal 
origin countries had a score of  3.238, 3.008, 3.313 and 3.016 on a 5-point scale, respectively.
94 In 2013, socialist legal origin countries had a score of  3.701 (on a 5-point scale) in terms of  
paternalistic shareholder protection, whilst English, French and German legal origin countries 
scored 3.116, 3.309 and 3.138, respectively.
95 Between 1990 and 2013, the aggregate value of  the shareholder protection index in English, 
French, German and socialist legal origin countries increased by 1.412, 3.007, 2.555 and 5.154 
on a 10-point scale, respectively.
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results are also suggestive of  a convergence around common law standards 
which have been associated with best practice in corporate governance, most 
notably the OECD Principles of  Corporate Governance. For instance, variable 
5 (independent board membership), which was spread throughout the world 
by international standards of  best practice, such as the OECD Principles of  
2004, underwent the most rapid increase of  all.96 Yet English common law 
countries had a higher average score in respect of  variable 5 over the period 
1990–2013. This is not an unexpected finding since, from the standpoint of  the 
legal origins theory, we should expect the diffusion of  legal rules and norms to 
be more extensive between countries of  the same legal family.97 But any legal 
origin effect had only a limited impact, especially until the early 1990s, and 
did not prevent civil legal origin systems from undergoing a rapid movement 
towards many features of  the common law model. The division into different 
legal origins or families may, therefore, no longer be a meaningful criterion of  
differentiation between different shareholder protection systems.
2. Economic Development and Shareholder Protection
The previous section casts doubt on one of  the main claims of  the legal origins 
hypothesis, ie that the quality of  laws governing shareholder protection differs 
systematically according to the legal origin. The second and related claim is 
that law matters to economic development, in the sense that there is a positive 
relationship between shareholder protection and economic development.98 To 
examine this claim, we divided the sample by whether a country is developed 
or developing, based on the IMF’s classification.99 Of  the total 30 countries, 
15 are in the developed country category (Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Spain, 
96 See above Part C.2. The recommendation to have a sufficient number of  independent directors 
is in s VI.E.1 of  the OECD Principles of  Corporate Governance 2004.
97 See Armour and others (n 7) 363–64.
98 This is mainly said to happen through improvements of  financial development, say, stimulation 
of  external finance through stock markets, eg in La Porta and others, ‘Law and Finance’ (n 
5). For further discussion see M Faure and J Smits (eds), Does Law Matter? On Law and Economic 
Growth (Intersentia 2001).
99 IMF, World Economic Outlook (2010) <www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2010/01/> (with 
the terminology “advanced” and “emerging”). It is noteworthy that from 1993 to 2004 the IMF 
used an additional grouping of  “countries in transition” to capture countries the economies 
of  which were in “a transitional state . . . from a centrally administered system to one based 
on market principles”. Seven countries in our sample, four former Soviet Republics (Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania and Russia) and three Eastern European countries (Czech Republic, Poland 
and Slovenia), fall into this category between 1993 and 2004. However, in 2004, on the occasion 
of  the accession of  several Eastern European countries into the European Union, the transition 
countries group was dropped. For a detailed account of  different development taxonomies see 
L Nylsen, ‘Classifications of  Countries Based on Their Level of  Development: How it is Done 
and How it Could be Done’ (2010) IMF Working Paper WP/11/31 <www.imf.org/external/
pubs/ft/wp/2011/wp1131.pdf>.
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Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US), whilst the remaining are catego-
rised as developing countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Estonia, India, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, South Africa 
and Turkey).
Fig 8 shows the aggregate of  the enabling and paternalistic tools of  share-
holder protection in developed and developing countries. Enabling shareholder 
protection is plotted as vertical columns and paternalistic shareholder protec-
tion is plotted as lines. Developed and developing countries are displayed in 
dark and light shades, respectively.
In relation to enabling tools of  shareholder protection, developing countries 
have lower scores throughout the 24-year period of  study than developed coun-
tries do. This should not be surprising because developed countries tend to have 
more sophisticated institutions, both legal (such as competent courts and supervi-
sory authorities) and non-legal (such as professional investors, specialised auditors, 
lawyers, consultants and financial press), that can steer a “proper” application 
of  enabling forms of  shareholder protection. Another explanation may derive 
from the “law matters” hypothesis.100 From this standpoint, developed coun-
tries might perform better than developing countries in enabling shareholder 
protection because their advanced legal system promotes financial sector devel-
opment. However, the causality relationship between economic development 
and shareholder protection may also run in the reverse direction, and economic 
development may precede legal development rather than vice versa.101
100 See above (n 98).
101 On a succinct summary of  this causality problem, see Siems (n 21) 231–33. See also the 
references to the institutional change literature above (nn 45–47). 34 
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101 See above n 99. 
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Notably, the difference in enabling shareholder protection between the two 
groups of  countries decreased over time, as developing countries gradually 
enacted more and more enabling forms of  protection.102 However, a greater 
increase is discernible in relation to the level of  paternalistic shareholder 
protection in developing countries. In particular, although both (developed and 
developing) paternalistic curves show a remarkable increase over the period 
of  study,103 developing countries have overtaken developed ones since the 
mid-1990s. There are several plateaus and steps in the developing countries’ 
paternalistic line, and there are points in time where the two groups had similar 
levels of  paternalistic shareholder protection. Nevertheless, developing countries 
clearly had more paternalistic protection than developing countries for most of  
the period studied. The jump in the developing countries score indicates the 
influence of  the strong state in economic development. This may be in line 
with the “Beijing consensus” view of  economic development and the diffusion 
of  the model of  authoritarian capitalism as an alternative to neoliberal ideas 
of  Western economies among developing countries.104
It is also interesting to examine how the tension between enabling and pater-
nalistic forms of  shareholder protection evolved over time within the developed 
and developing country groups. For developed countries, we observe greater 
levels of  enabling shareholder protection throughout the study period. In 
contrast, for developing countries, the level of  paternalistic shareholder protec-
tion has overcome enabling shareholder protection since 2002. This finding is 
consistent with the claim that for corporate law to play a facilitative function 
it must be combined with other legal, market and cultural control mechanisms 
which are often absent in developing countries. Or, to put it in the words of  
Bernard Black and Reinier Kraakman,
[t]he assumptions that support the enabling model are clearly inapposite in emerging 
economies, where informational asymmetries are severe, markets are far less effi-
cient, contracting costs are high because standard practices have not yet developed, 
enforcement of  contracts is problematic because of  weak courts, market participants 
are less experiences, reputable intermediaries are unavailable or prohibitively expen-
sive, and the economy itself  is likely to be in flux.105
These contextual features might explain why developing countries have seemed 
to favour a paternalistic model of  shareholder protection since the early 2000s. 
102 The average difference in the scores of  enabling shareholder protection between developed and 
developing countries was reduced from 0.615 to 0.358 (on a 5-point scale) from 1990 to 2013.
103 On the general increase of  paternalistic shareholder protection in our sample countries during 
the period of  study see above Part D.2.
104 Eg T Ambrosio, ‘The Rise of  the “China Model” and “Beijing Consensus”: Evidence of  
Authoritarian Diffusion?’ (2012) 18 Contemporary Politics 381.
105 B Black and R Kraakman, ‘A Self-Enforcing Model of  Corporate Law’ (1996) 109 Harvard 
Law Review 1911, 1924.
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A greater level of  paternalistic protection might also compensate for the low 
probability of  enforcement in these countries.106
Despite the greater paternalistic protection afforded by developing countries 
since the early 1990s, we find that shareholder protection at the aggregate level 
is less in developing countries throughout the period of  study. Yet the difference 
in shareholder protection between the two groups decreased over time, and 
developing countries have been catching up with their developed counterparts 
mainly due to the increase in paternalistic protection in these countries. It is 
notable that from 1990 to 2013 the aggregate shareholder protection in devel-
oping countries increased from 2.844 to 6.207 on a 10-point scale, compared 
to an increase from 3.571 to 6.378 in developed countries.
Overall, the findings presented in this section suggest that, as with the legal 
origins claims, the state of  economic development is of  little relevance for 
today’s company laws. Rather, as economic conditions come closer together,107 
the law on shareholder protection also becomes more similar, at least as far as 
the positive law is concerned.
f. AnALySIS BASed on dIfferenceS 
Between IndIVIduAL oBSerVAtIonS
1. Convergence or Divergence in Shareholder Protection
Up to this point, this article has analysed the data as a measure of  the strength 
of  shareholder protection, be it as the aggregate of  all 10 variables or as the 
sub-aggregates of  the enabling and paternalistic forms of  shareholder protec-
tion. But there is also another way to make sense of  our dataset.
This is based on the thinking that if, for example, two countries have an 
aggregate score of  5 out of  10 variables, their underlying laws may be very 
different since different variables may have led to the same score. To highlight 
the precise differences between countries, it is thus necessary to calculate for 
each variable whether there is a difference between the two countries, and then 
aggregate those differences.108 Given the time dimension of  our dataset, it is 
then possible to trace whether and how over the last 24 years such differences 
have evolved. For example, this may show how far there has been convergence 
106 ibid 1916.
107 For empirical studies showing economic globalisation see, eg A Dreher, N Gaston and P 
Martens, Measuring Globalisation—Gauging its Consequences (Springer 2008) (with data available 
at <www.globalization.kof.ethz.ch>); A McGrew, ‘The Logics of  Economic Globalisation in 
J Ravenhill (ed), Global Political Economy (3rd edn, OUP 2011) 279–91 (data on trade, finance, 
production and labour migration); E Prasad and others, ‘Effects of  Financial Globalization on 
Developing Countries: Some Empirical Evidence’ (2003) IMF Working Paper <www.imf.org/
external/np/res/docs/2003/031703.pdf>.
108 For this approach see also Lele and Siems (n 8) 37.
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or divergence of  the formal legal rules (see this subsection),109 and to what 
degree countries that had similar laws in 1990 are still similar in 2013 (see the 
next subsection).
If  one examines how different each of  the 30 countries is from the other 
29 countries of  our dataset, this leads to (30 × 29)/2 = 435 country pairs or 
time series. As it would not be feasible to display all of  these graphs, Fig 9 
focuses on five time series. The first four deal with the differences between 
all countries, ie the average value for each variable, and the respective vari-
ables in French, German, UK and US law. France, Germany and the UK (or 
England) are often seen as the three “origin” countries that have influenced the 
laws of  other countries of  the world. In particular, the aforementioned “law 
and finance” view is that French, German and English legal origins are the 
109 This “formal convergence” may be distinguished from “functional convergence”, which is 
where the mere strength of  shareholder protection (ie the aggregate) becomes more similar. 
See Armour and others, ‘How Do Legal Rules Evolve’ (n 6) 620.
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Fig. 9 Convergence or Divergence in Shareholder Protection 
The general trend line shows that there has been convergence of the legal rules on sharehold-
er protection: the average difference of all country-pairs has dropped from a maximum of 
2.74 in the early 1990s to 2.23 now. This may not be seen as considerable change; yet, it is 
interesting to note that this trend has been gradual and steady throughout the time series, 
without any change-points, eg, with the dot-com bubble, the accession of new members states 
to the EU or the global financial crisis.113 Overall, this confirms previous research which, us-
ing more limited time series, found that countries have, generally speaking, converged in the 
                                                 
113 In results, not reported here, we conducted a Chow test and a CUSUM statistic in the mean of the 
time series of the development for ‘“all countries’”  (see above Ssection D), not finding a change-
point in this time series. 
Fig 9 Convergence or Divergence in Shareholder Protection
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main building blocks of  most legal systems of  the world.110 In addition, it is 
interesting to examine how the differences from US law have evolved because 
it is sometimes said that there has been a significant Americanisation of  other 
countries’ laws in recent years.111 Finally, the figure displays the development 
for “all countries”, ie the general trend of  whether there has been convergence 
or divergence of  the law.
The general trend line shows that there has been convergence of  the legal 
rules on shareholder protection: the average difference of  all country pairs has 
dropped from a maximum of  2.74 in the early 1990s to 2.23 in 2013. This 
may not be seen as a considerable change; however, it is interesting to note 
that this trend has been gradual and steady throughout the time series, without 
any change-points, eg with the dot-com bubble, the accession of  new Members 
States to the EU or the global financial crisis.112 Overall, this confirms previous 
research which, using more limited time series, found that countries have gener-
ally converged with regard to the law on shareholder protection. This previous 
research also explained that the most likely driving forces for such a develop-
ment are the transplantation of  certain “fashionable” concepts of  company law, 
for example, the need to provide independent directors or to disclose major 
shareholder ownership.113
Throughout the period, German law was more similar to the rest of  the 
countries than French, UK and US law, though there has been a slight diver-
gence in recent years. The initial similarity can be explained by the relatively 
low levels of  shareholder protection in Germany in the early 1990s, which 
were similar to most of  the other countries but different from French, UK and 
US law.114 The subsequent German reforms were then also replicated in many 
of  those other countries, for example, in the transition economies of  Eastern 
Europe.115
In Fig 9, France, the UK and the US have been “in a tight battle”. Initially, 
the US was slightly closer to the other countries, but this changed in 2003—
due to the requirement of  the NYSE listing rules that half  of  all board 
members should be independent.116 This was followed by some convergence, 
since some of  the other countries also introduced or strengthened the law on 
independent directors117 Overall, however, the comparison of  the time trends 
110 See above Part E.1.
111  See above Part A, as well as Part D.2 (for the enabling features of  US law).
112 We also conducted (not reported here) a Chow test and a CUSUM statistic on the mean of  
the time series of  the development for “all countries” (see above Part D), but did not find a 
change-point in this time series.
113 See the references in nn 6–8.
114 The aggregate values for 1990 are: Germany, 3.08; France, 6.75; US, 6.75; UK, 6.125.
115 This mainly concerns the variables on independent directors, derivative actions, mandatory bid 
and ownership disclosure (variables 5, 7, 9 and 10).
116 NYSE Manual, § 303A.01. This coincided with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002.
117 See variable 5 in Fig 3, as well as n 34 in Part C.2 above.
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does not indicate that the US model of  corporate law has become the most 
influential one. Instead, countries have more steadily converged to the laws of  
the UK and France. As the plots of  these two countries are fairly similar, it 
is not possible to say whether, in this respect, there has been a global trend 
towards the common law or the civil law approach in company law.
We also conducted further analyses distinguishing between groups of  
countries and variables. First, it was hypothesised that the convergence was 
predominantly the result of  EU harmonisation. Thus, we distinguished between 
non-EU and EU countries (based on the current membership), and this showed 
that the convergence was indeed mainly due to the latter countries. Examining 
the data more closely, we also found that it is mainly the 2004 accession coun-
tries that have determined this trend. However, the time trend started as long 
ago as the early 1990s, and there is no apparent change-point in 2004 in Fig 9: 
thus, while two of  our variables are related to EU law,118 overall, it is the more 
general law reforms of  transition economies, and not EU harmonisation, that 
have been the main driving force for this convergence of  the law.
Secondly, we return to the distinction between enabling and paternalistic 
variables. At the aggregate level, the main trend has been that legal systems 
have increased the use of  paternalistic forms of  shareholder protection while 
enabling forms have stayed relatively stable.119 However, if  we consider the 
change at the level of  differences for each variable and country pair, it is the 
enabling variables that account for the convergence of  the law.120 The likely 
explanation is that, with respect to these variables, there is indeed a consensus 
emerging.121 By contrast, the introduction of  paternalistic forms of  shareholder 
protection is more contentious: thus, while there is a common trend, details 
have remained more diverse.
2. Re-examining the Composition of  Groups
The previous section of  this article examined the relevance of  categories such 
as legal origins and stages of  economic development.122 An alternative approach 
is to start without such a priori categories in order to find out whether partic-
ular countries belong together. A popular way of  identifying such groups are 
cluster analyses, which can be defined as:
118 See above Part C.2.
119 See above Part D.2.
120 The average difference for the five paternalistic variables dropped from 1.38 to 1.29, and the 
one for the five enabling variables from 1.29 to 0.96.
121 Eg in 2013, variable 8 has the value of  “1” in 25 of  the 30 countries; no legal system scores 
“0” for variable 2, and only one of  them does for variable 6; see also the note to Table 1 above 
for the classification of  variables.
122 See also above Part E.
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multivariate procedures that divide a data-set into a number of  subgroups (clusters). 
In general, they refer to measures of  similarity or dissimilarity between observa-
tions with respect to a set of  variables. These are then grouped into clusters of  low 
within-cluster variance and high variance between clusters. In particular, this can be 
achieved by successively increasing the tolerated level of  within-cluster dissimilarity.123
In the present case, the 435 country pairs124 can be regarded as a valued network 
that shows the difference between each pair.125 With the help of  a network 
analysis program,126 it is then possible to calculate “optimisation clusters”. This 
refers to a formal method that “optimises a cost function which measures the 
total distance or similarity within classes for a proximity matrix”.127 The user 
has to determine in advance how many clusters shall be created. In the present 
case, this has been done for various numbers for the years 1990, 2001 and 
2013. The results with the highest explanatory power (R2) are presented in 
Fig 10.
The chart shows that in all three years there is one large cluster of  mainly 
civil law countries. Some common law countries occasionally join this cluster 
123 M Graff, ‘Law and Finance: Common Law and Civil Law Countries Compared: an Empirical 
Critique’ (2008) 75 Economica 60, 72.
124 See above Part F.1.
125 Such an approach of  pairs (or dyads) is also used in political science and international relations: 
eg T Sommerer and others, ‘The Pair Approach: What Causes Convergence of  Environmental 
Policies?’ in K Holzinger and others (eds), Environmental Policy Convergence in Europe (CUP 2008) 
144–95. For the idea of  a “comparative legal network analysis” see Siems, above n 6 (web of  
creditor and shareholder protection).
126 UCINET <www.sites.google.com/site/ucinetsoftware/home>.
127 Definition at <www.analytictech.com/ucinet/help/2cvtid.htm>. 
43 
present case, this has been done for various numbers for the years 1990, 2001 and 2013. The 
results with the highest explan tory power (R2) are presented in Fi ure 10.
Explanatory powers (R2): 0.504 (1990); 0.340 (2001); 0.347 (2013) 
Fig. 10  Clusters in 1990, 2001 and 2013
The chart shows that in all three years there is one large cluster of mainly civil law countries. 
Some common law countries occasionally join this cluster (eg, Pakistan in 1990, India and 
Malaysia in 2013) and gradually this cluster has become a bit smaller (from 21 to 17 mem-
bers). The countries that have remained in this cluster (in bold) are all civil law countries. 
In 1990 the smaller cluster may also be interpreted along legal-family lines as it has main-
ly common law countries, as well as Japan which in company law has also been influenced 
by US corporate law.129 But, this changed in the subsequent years: there have been frequent 
variations in memberships and groups do not appear to be very persistent. In 2001, we have 
                                                 
129 See generally D Kelemen and EC Sibbitt, ‘“The Americanization of Japanese Law’” (2002) 23 
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 269.  Formatted: Font: Not Italic
Fig 10 Clusters in 1990, 2001 and 2013
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(eg Pakistan in 1990, India and Malaysia in 2013), but this cluster has gradually 
become smaller (from 21 to 17 members). The countries that have remained in 
the cluster throughout (in bold) are all civil law countries.
In 1990, the second largest may also be interpreted along legal family lines 
as it mainly comprises common law countries, together with Japan, which in 
company law has also been influenced by US corporate law.128 But this changed 
in the subsequent years: there have been frequent variations in memberships, 
and groups do not appear to be very persistent. In 2001, there are three smaller 
mixed common law–civil law clusters. Two of  these clusters are also mixed in 
terms of  developed and developing countries. In 2013, these groups changed 
again, but not in line with the common and civil law categories. It may be 
possible to observe some distinction between stages of  economic development, 
eg with France and the US in one cluster. Overall, though, these categories do 
not seem to be very intuitive. Moreover, it can be seen that the explanatory 
power of  the clusters (R2) has dropped compared to 1990.
The main explanation for this development is that, in today’s world, rules 
of  shareholder protection are not necessarily different any more just because 
countries are from different legal families and continents.129 This is also in line 
with previous CBR research which found that, in recent years, legal transplants 
and other forms of  influence (say, through the OECD or the World Bank) tend 
to break up the established divisions between groups of  countries in company 
law.130
It is also suggested that this result is consistent with the general trend towards 
legal convergence. In the political science literature, it is sometimes suggested 
that the development is towards “polarisation” or “dual convergence”, meaning 
that groups of  countries will share similar models.131 However, at least for the 
question of  shareholder protection, our results show the reverse trend: initially, 
there may have been some justification to talk about countries belonging to 
distinct groups, but now—together with the overall trend towards conver-
gence—these group differences have faded away.
128 See generally D Kelemen and EC Sibbitt, ‘The Americanization of  Japanese Law’ (2002) 23 
University of  Pennsylvania Journal of  International Economic Law 269. 
129 This is similar to the findings at the aggregate level. See above Part E.1.
130 See references in nn 6–8 above. See also above Part E.
131 C Hay, ‘Globalization’s Impact on States’ in J Ravenhill (ed), Global Political Economy (3rd edn, 
OUP 2011) 320; C Hay, ‘Common Trajectories, Variable Paces, Divergent Outcomes? Models 
of  European Capitalism Under Conditions of  Complex Economic Interdependence’ (2004) 11 
Review of  International Political Economy 231.
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G. concLuSIon
This article has used an original leximetric dataset in order to scrutinise three 
key paradigms of  comparative company law. The first paradigm, suggested 
in the introduction, was that company law may be path-dependent, and that 
therefore the core characteristics of  a country’s law may be persistent and not 
subject to frequent changes or major shifts. In contradiction to this statement, 
all of  the countries in our study have engaged in reforms strengthening various 
tools of  shareholder protection.132 Some of  our specific results may support 
the view of  remaining path dependencies, namely that, since 2007, changes 
in shareholder protection have become less frequent, and that there are still 
some differences between developed and developing countries.133 But the other 
specific findings speak against the strong influence of  path dependencies: in 
the 24 years studied, paternalistic tools have overtaken enabling tools of  share-
holder protection and the discrepancy between legal origins has faded away, 
both at the aggregate level and if  one examines the differences between each 
variable for each country pair.134
The second paradigm was that a market-oriented conception of  company 
law may have become the dominant one, in particular as we may observe 
an Americanisation of  the law in many countries of  the world. It may be 
regarded as a confirmation of  this statement that, according to our findings, 
the requirement of  independent directors has indeed spread from the US to 
other parts of  the world.135 However, in our taxonomy, this requirement is 
not an “enabling” but a “paternalistic” form of  shareholder protection,136 and 
therefore not a typical feature of  a market-oriented company law. More gener-
ally, we also do not find that a US-style company law has become the most 
influential model. In contrast to any such expectations, the data show that there 
is a trend towards paternalistic forms of  shareholder protection, that civil law 
countries now have laws with as strong shareholder protection as common law 
countries, and that US law is noticeably different from the laws of  the other 
countries.137
The third paradigm claimed that, in order to explain the remaining differ-
ences in strength and forms of  shareholder protection, legal origins and the 
stage of  economic development are likely to be the most decisive factors. The 
general trend shows, however, that all legal systems have strengthened both 
enabling and paternalistic tools of  shareholder protection regardless of  legal 
132 See above Part C.
133 See above Parts D.1 and E.2.
134 See above Parts D.2, E.1 and F.
135 See above Part C.2.
136 See above Part B.
137 See above Parts D.2, E.2 and F.
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origin and stage of  economic development.138 More specifically, the group-
based analyses have demonstrated that all legal origins now have about the 
same level of  shareholder protection on average, and that both developed and 
developing countries follow the same trend in terms of  stronger reliance on 
paternalistic tools of  shareholder protection.139 Furthermore, by clustering the 
countries, it can be seen that, since the 2000s, groups of  similar countries do 
not necessarily share the same legal origin and stage of  development.140
Reflecting on the wider implications of  our findings, we can see that in 
company law certain “fads and fashions”141 have spread around the world since 
the early 1990s. But it is also revealing that we found a change-point in both 
the aggregate and paternalistic shareholder protection time series in 2007 to be 
the result of  a reduction in the number of  reforms in shareholder protection in 
recent years. Thus, it seems to be the case that, following the global financial 
crisis, policy makers have now turned their main attention to other matters of  
business law, notably banking, securities and financial law. A further impor-
tant general finding concerns the transition and developing countries in our 
study. While these countries have not been immune from the aforementioned 
dynamics, they have also followed a distinct trajectory insofar as they rely more 
on paternalistic forms of  shareholder protection than developed countries. This 
shows that, despite global trends, law makers are able to deviate from influen-
tial models in company law.
138 See above Part C.
139 See above Part E.
140 See above Part F.2.
141 BR Cheffins, ‘The Trajectory of  (Corporate Law) Scholarship’ (2004) 63 Cambridge Law 
Journal 456.
